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. Robinson [Formerly an investigative journalist in Managua and Washington, DC, Robinson
is the author of "A Faustian Bargain, The Untold Story of US Involvement in the Nicaraguan
Elections" (Westview Press: release date, early 1992). The following article is based on excerpts
from the forthcoming book.] The report in the October 21, 1991 issue of Newsweek that the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) provided $600,000 to help finance the electoral campaign of the antiSandinista Nicaraguan Opposition Union (UNO) has sparked a political scandal in Nicaragua
and has raised eyebrows among those in the US and elsewhere who followed the 1990 elections.
According to the Newsweek report, the $600,000 was earmarked for UNO political leaders as part
of a Program for Repatriation of Exiled Nicaraguans (PREN) run by the CIA. The report claims
that the program was managed inside Nicaragua by Alfredo Cesar, chief campaign manager for
then-candidate Violeta Chamorro. Cesar, one of the most powerful and controversial politicians in
Nicaragua, is currently president of Nicaragua's Legislative Assembly. As head of the legislature,
he has been embroiled in recent months in heated political battles with the executive branch and
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). (See "Nicaragua: Collapse of the `Political Center',"
CAU, 09/20/91, and "Nicaragua: On Property and Politics," CAU 09/25/91). The current scandal
notwithstanding, the Newsweek disclosure is hardly "news." The magazine reported on two
separate occasions during the 1989-1990 electoral process in September 1989 and in March 1990
that the CIA had spent at least US$11 million in consecutive covert intervention programs to
influence the Nicaraguan vote. The only new revelation is the particular corruption of Alfredo
Cesar, who, according to the article, decided to spread among his friends $100,000 of the funds
which the CIA had expected to be judiciously invested in the UNO electoral coalition. Alfredo Cesar
did not become a "CIA asset" in 1989. His ties to the Agency date back at least to the early 1980s.
(For biographical background on Cesar, see "Nicaragua: Collapse of the `Political Center'," CAU,
09/20/91.) After leaving Nicaragua for voluntary exile in Costa Rica in 1981, Cesar joined the USfinanced contra group ARDE (Alianza Revolucionaria Democratica), and then eventually formed
his own contra group, BOS (Bloque Opositor del Sur). There is, however, much more to the story
than the $600,000 and Cesar's intrigues. The Newsweek disclosure and the events surrounding it
relate to a major shift in US policy towards Nicaragua dating back to 1988. This shift culminated in
a massive campaign of intervention in the electoral process, much of which has to date remained
hidden from the public. By 1988, the contras had been defeated in the battlefields of Nicaragua.
The Reagan administration's contra policy was thoroughly discredited internationally, the Central
American presidents were calling for the demobilization and civilian integration of the contra forces
as part of the Esquipulas peace process, and the outgoing Reaganites could not muster enough
domestic support to resuscitate an anti-Sandinista "military option." US strategists initiated a shift
from the "contra phase" to the "internal opposition phase" in the anti-Sandinista campaign. This
involved creating the infrastructure for extensive intervention in Nicaragua's internal political
affairs, and particularly, for involvement in the elections. The electoral process had begun in 1988,
with a political opening inside Nicaragua, modification of electoral legislation and political party
regulations, and other pre-electoral activities. The electoral period formally opened in February
1989, when Daniel Ortega called early elections, scheduling the vote for February 25, 1990. A
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cornerstone of the Reagan administration's contra policy was to recruit the anti-Sandinista political
leadership engaged in civic opposition inside Nicaragua into the ranks of the contra movement,
based in Honduras, Costa Rica and Miami. These recruits included Arturo Cruz Senior and Junior,
Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Jr. (son of President Violeta Chamorro), Azucena Ferrey and her brother
Roberto, Alfonso Robelo, Ernesto Palacio, and numerous other prominent domestic opposition
figures. Among the most important of these was Alfredo Cesar. This steady stream of political
leaders out of Nicaragua to join the ranks of the contras' "political directorates" gave legitimacy to
the counterrevolutionary military movement, but also deprived the domestic opposition of its "best
and brightest." The shift in strategy from externally-based military aggression to internal political
intervention entailed building up the anti-Sandinista civic opposition inside Nicaragua by providing
funds, supplies and political guidance. This effort required reversing the earlier Reagan policy:
the same anti-Sandinista political leaders who had been brought out of Nicaragua had to be sent
back in to participate in the electoral process. As Asst. Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Bernard Aronson explained in early 1989, "The Reagan policy was to take the political protagonists
out of Nicaragua. Ours is to put them back in." Arranging for contra leaders to, in the words of the
Newsweek article, "go back to Nicaragua and support Chamorro," became known as the PREN
operation. It was Alfredo Cesar who the CIA assigned to manage PREN. Cesar, who until late 1987
had focused on his Costa Rican-based activities, was brought in December of that year into the
political directorate of the Nicaraguan Resistance, the umbrella group of contra military and political
forces, whose offices were in Washington, DC, Miami and Tegucigalpa, Honduras. Cesar and his
mentors knew that the contra movement was winding down; his job was not to bolster the "military
option" but to prepare the terrain, within the armed contra movement for the shift to internal
political opposition. Between 1983 and 1988, the CIA had been spending over $10 million per year
out of special contingency funds to maintain contra offices in Washington, Miami, Tegucigalpa, San
Jose and several other Latin American and European capitals. In mid-1988, however, the Agency
began to reduce these allotments, transferring contingency funds from contra to internal opposition
activities. In December 1988 funds for the two US offices (Washington and Miami) were halved,
and then in April, the Washington office was definitively closed. Four months later, in August 1989,
the last allotment of $200,000 was disbursed and the Miami and other remaining offices were shut
down forever. This did not represent a death knell for most contra political leaders, but rather a
transmutation into UNO leaders. It was these contingency funds which the CIA re-routed to the
PREN program, as well as other electoral-related activities. Starting in late 1988, Cesar became "bagman" (the term used in the lexicon of covert operations) for the CIA funds, and began shuttling back
and forth from Washington and Miami to Managua, Tegucigalpa, San Jose, Guatemala City, and
Caracas. Cesar worked feverishly on these trips, setting up an international infrastructure which was
useful in facilitating US support for UNO and the return of contra political leaders. The ambitious
Cesar also took advantage to establish a network of contacts and to accumulate political influence
that would later prove crucial in his rise to prominence in post-electoral Nicaraguan politics. It
was the PREN funds that Cesar used to buy allegiances among opposition leaders. One US source
explained that the CIA was particularly pleased with Cesar's close relation to candidate Chamorro:
"We invested a lot of money in Cesar. We put him on the payroll. We turned him into a kind of
`Rasputin.'" Between late 1988 and August 1989 dozens of top and mid-level contra political leaders
returned to Nicaragua to participate in the elections, among them Cesar himself, Pedro Joaquin
Jr., Azucena and Roberto Ferrey, Alfonso Robelo, and Humberto Belli. The PREN program was
producing the intended results. Not only were the contra political leaders returning to boost the
Chamorro campaign, but after the elections, many of these same people, including Alfredo Cesar,
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would go on to assume positions of importance in the new government. How much impact US
intervention had in the outcome of the elections is not clear. The Sandinistas might have lost in
a free election anyway. However, the US clearly perverted Nicaragua's internal political process
by investing tens of millions of dollars and enormous political capital in the vote. US resources
were employed in a myriad of forms, including direct cash payments, supplies, anti-Sandinista
propaganda activities, salaries for dozens of US and international electoral experts and advisers who
worked with the inexperienced UNO politicians, political pressures on the beleaguered Sandinista
regime, etc. Antonio Lacayo, Nicaragua's current Minister of the Presidency and director of Violeta
Chamorro's campaign during the electoral process, has called the latest Newsweek report on
CIA funding "completely false." Given the vast network of pass-throughs, "cut-outs" and thirdparty channels in which US covert operations are generally conducted, Lacayo might have been
completely unaware of the real source of the support he and the UNO coalition received during
the electoral campaign. Meanwhile, the Sandinistas had agreed to permit what in most other
countries in the world is proscribed and punishable as a felony above-board foreign financing for
parties and candidates in elections. In this way, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED),
a quasi-governmental agency, spent no less than US$12 million "overtly" in public funds on the
Nicaraguan electoral process, mostly in support of UNO and the civic and media groups allied to
it. However, edgy over the prospects of covert intervention in the elections, the Nicaraguan regime
began to express reservations over this NED involvement. These doubts were assuaged by former
US president Jimmy Carter, who was then heading an important international delegation to observe
the Nicaraguan vote, and acting as unofficial interlocutor between the Bush administration and
the Nicaraguan government. On September 21, 1989, Carter met with President Bush at the White
House. During the meeting, Bush gave Carter his "absolute assurance" that there would be no
covert CIA operations to influence the Nicaraguan vote. The next day, on September 22, Carter
faxed a confidential letter to Managua address to then-president Daniel Ortega, stating: "I have
received absolute assurances from US officials at the highest level...that there will be no covert
funding from our government for opposition political parties or other purposes that would subvert
the integrity of the Nicaraguan elections." By that time, however, the CIA had already invested
at least US$5 million specifically in the Nicaraguan elections, a fact reported by Newsweek in its
September 24, 1989, and October 9, 1989 editions. And it would continue its investment. Within
days of Carter's "absolute assurances" from Bush that there would be no covert subversion of the
elections, President Bush signed a top-secret finding authorizing an additional US$6 million to
influence the vote through a special "regional program," a fact reported in Newsweek's March 12,
1990 edition. Limited PREN contingency funds ($600,000 during the final months of the electoral
campaign, according to the most recent Newsweek disclosure) continued to flow into the hands
of opposition leaders, particularly Alfredo Cesar. The funds pertaining to the "regional program,"
however, were spent on special "regional" projects in Central America and Europe, among them
the establishment of an UNO political training school in San Jose, Costa Rica, and psychological
operations conducted through media outlets to influence the Nicaraguan electorate. Whether Jimmy
Carter, along with the Sandinistas, had been "deceived by the dirty hands of the CIA" on covert
involvement in the Nicaraguan elections, as former Nicaraguan vice president Sergio Ramirez
claimed in an October 16 press conference in Managua, is not clear. However, it is worth recalling
that Carter, within months of the 1979 overthrow of the Somoza regime by the Sandinistas, had
signed his own top-secret finding authorizing the CIA to provide support to political opponents
of the Sandinistas, according to Washington Post journalist Bob Woodward, in his book "Veil, The
Secret Wars of the CIA." This support was intended "to insure that the agency would have contacts
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and friends among the leaders of a new government." Eleven years later came the "payoff": as the
latest Newsweek revelation makes clear, the agency has established its "contacts and friends" in the
post-Sandinista Nicaraguan government.

-- End --
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